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A successful energy transition will depend not only on the development of new energy
technologies, but also on changes in the patterns of individual energy-related decisions
and behaviors resulting in substantial reductions in energy demand. Across scientific
disciplines, most theoretical approaches that try to understand energy-related decisions
and behaviors focus mainly on cognitive processes, such as computations of utility (typi-
cally economic), the impact of cognitive heuristics, or the role of individual beliefs. While
these models already explain important aspects of human decisions and behavior in the
energy domain, we argue that an additional consideration of the contributions of emotional
processes may be very fruitful for a deeper understanding of the issue. In this contribution,
we outline a theoretical perspective on energy-related decisions and behaviors that inte-
grates emotions, elicited by a cognitive-affective appraisal of the relevance of a situation,
into a response system driving adaptive decisions and behaviors. We empirically investi-
gate the explanatory power of the model variables to predict intentions to reduce energy
use demonstrating that the appraisal–emotion variables are able to account for additional
variance that is not explained by two established models focused on cognitive processes
(theory of planned behavior and value-belief-norm theory). Finally, we discuss how the
appraisal–emotion approach may be fruitfully integrated with other existing approaches
and outline some questions for future research.
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INTRODUCTION
An increasing number of countries have implemented policies tar-
geting the increased use of renewable energy sources, improved
energy efficiency, and the abatement of greenhouse gas emissions.
The success of this energy transition will depend not only on
the development of new energy technologies, but also on major
changes in the patterns of individual energy-related decisions and
behaviors resulting in substantial reductions in energy demand.
To an increasing extent, this is being acknowledged by science
and stakeholders. The Stern Review on the Economics of Cli-
mate Change, for example, points out the removal of barriers to
behavioral change as one of three essential elements of energy
and climate policy (next to carbon pricing and technology policy;
Stern, 2007). It is thus of crucial interest for society and policy
makers to gain an understanding of the underlying factors and
mechanisms that drive these decisions and behaviors.
Given the importance of the issue, several disciplines of the
behavioral sciences have advanced theoretical frameworks that
aim to identify target variables for potential interventions to
reduce energy demand (see Wilson and Dowlatabadi, 2007 for a
review). For example, classic microeconomic approaches focus on
the “rational actor” model, which assumes that people make their
decisions by comparing the utility of the different available options
and by choosing the outcome with the highest utility, while having
access to all the important information that is needed for a rational
decision (Becker, 1976). In their decisions, people are assumed to
act based on preferences that are known to them, invariant and
consistent, and always aiming at the maximization of their utility.
Utility is often expressed in monetary terms, and interventions
that aim at changing energy-related decisions and behaviors are
mainly focusing on changes in price structures (e.g., increasing
energy prices), which result in an increased utility of reducing
one’s energy use (Tietenberg, 1990). More recently, approaches
from the field of behavioral economics have gained popularity.
They take into account empirical observations showing that indi-
viduals’ decisions are not always based on rational deliberations,
but are subject to a number of cognitive shortcuts and biases
(Kahneman, 2003). For example, people tend to be overly influ-
enced by cognitive anchors (e.g., the status quo; see Samuelson
and Zeckhauser, 1988) or by the framing of the choice situation
(e.g., whether it emphasizes potential losses or gains; see Tver-
sky and Kahneman, 1981). These biases can be exploited when
decision situations are designed in a certain manner in order to
“nudge” people toward decisions and behaviors that reduce energy
use (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008), e.g., by changing default settings
on household appliances to less energy-intensive programs.
Whereas economic approaches mainly focus on aspects of the
decision situation, especially the underlying incentive structure,
psychological approaches emphasize the importance of internal
factors on the side of the decider, such as belief structures, value
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systems, attitudes, or norms (Ajzen, 1991; Stern, 2000). Individ-
ual differences in, for example, beliefs about the causes or the
importance of climate change or explicit attitudes toward energy
conservation are considered important drivers of energy-related
decisions. Interventions based on these approaches may include
strategies that aim at changing people’s beliefs or attitudes (Cial-
dini, 2009) in order to promote reductions in energy use, and may
be tailored to specific groups of people (such as people with high
environmental values, see, e.g., Sutterlin et al., 2011).
Across disciplines, most theoretical approaches that try to
understand energy-related decisions and behaviors focus exclu-
sively on cognitive processes. Computations of utility, the impact
of cognitive heuristics, or the role of individual beliefs and social
norms are considered the main drivers of relevant decisions. Only
a few theories take into account the role of affective processes and
emotions (see, e.g., Kals and Muller, 2012). If these processes are
considered, they are often conceptualized as biases that interfere
with rational thinking. For example, peoples’ judgments about the
risks and benefits of nuclear energy are explained by their initial
affective responses and gut feelings (Finucane et al., 2000); inten-
sive car use is explained by strong emotional attachment to the
car (Marsh and Collett, 1986). Emotions are thus reduced to an
irrational bias that leads to suboptimal decisions that are not in
the best interest of the individual or the environment.
The view of emotions as an irrational force that opposes cog-
nition and reasoned thought dominated in philosophy for many
centuries (see, e.g., the writings by Plato or Descartes), and still
today survives in many academic disciplines as well as in lay theo-
ries of emotion. However, over the last two decades, psychological
and neuroscientific research on emotions has made great strides
toward a revision of this conceptualization. Recent theories on the
functioning of emotions consider emotion and cognition not as
separate, opposing entities, but as strongly intertwined and com-
plementary (Scherer, 2009; Brosch, 2013; Sander, 2013). Cognitive
appraisal processes that automatically and continuously evaluate
our environment to detect relevant information play a crucial
role in the elicitation of emotions. Emotional responses carry
important information about the value of objects or events in our
environment, and help us focus on the most important aspects
of the surrounding environment by adaptively modulating our
cognitive systems (Brosch et al., 2013). Affective processes and
emotions thus should not be considered as irrational forces that
are counterproductive to our decision-making, but to the contrary
as processes yielding important information that, together with
cognitive considerations, can help us make very “rational” (i.e.,
adaptive and useful) decisions. Given the fundamental interest of
society to understand energy-related decisions and behaviors, it
may be fruitful and important to take into account affective and
emotional processes, as they may contribute to a better under-
standing of the underlying mechanisms, improved predictions of
the resulting choices and behaviors, as well as potential leverage
for more effective interventions.
In this contribution, we outline a theoretical perspective
on energy-related decisions and behaviors based on these
recent theoretical developments1. In this perspective, emotional
1Note that the perspective outlined here primarily addresses the individual citizen
in his/her role as final user of energy.
responses are integrated into a response system that drives adaptive
decisions and behaviors based on a cognitive-affective evaluation.
We begin by summarizing and discussing current developments in
emotion psychology and neuroscience that describe how the per-
spective regarding the functionality (or “rationality”) of emotion
has changed over the last few decades (“affective turn”). We then
describe two of the most influential theoretical models that have
previously been used to explain energy-related decision-making
and behavior, the theory of planned behavior (TPB, Ajzen, 1991)
and the value-belief-norm theory (VBN, Stern, 2000). While these
models already explain important aspects of human decisions and
behavior in the energy domain, we argue that an additional con-
sideration of the contributions of emotional processes may be very
fruitful for a deeper understanding of the topic. To this end, we
outline a perspective describing how appraisal processes and emo-
tions may inform decisions and behaviors in the energy domain.
We then present empirical data that compares the explanatory
power of our appraisal–emotion approach with the two estab-
lished psychological theories TPB and VBN in order to evaluate
whether our approach can add explanatory value to the predic-
tion of intentions to reduce energy use. Finally, we discuss how
the appraisal–emotion approach may be fruitfully integrated with
other existing approaches and outline some questions for future
research.
THE RELATIONSHIP OF COGNITION AND EMOTION
Beginning with Plato, philosophers have often characterized the
functioning of the human mind as a battle between opposing
forces: reason, rational, and deliberate versus emotion, impul-
sive, and irrational (Goldie, 2010). This thinking has also been
reflected in psychological theories and research on emotion: emo-
tions were considered as interference that is counterproductive
for a correct functioning of cognitive mechanisms, and thus per-
ception, attention, memory, or decision-making were investigated
without taking into account the effects of emotion. After a long
time of neglect, however, the last two decades have seen an enor-
mous increase in research on emotion highlighting the importance
of emotional processes for a successful functioning of the human
mind (Davidson et al., 2003; Sander and Scherer, 2009).
For example, neuropsychological studies have shown that
patients with brain lesions that cause emotional dysfunctions
can be highly impaired in everyday decision-making and social
interactions (Damasio, 1994). These patients show inappropriate
actions that lead to financial losses, to losses in social standing,
and to conflicts with their family and friends. They also show
a substantially reduced emotional reactivity to many types of
events and a very limited interoception of their bodily responses,
whereas their rational problem-solving abilities remain largely
intact. These observations have led to the hypothesis that emo-
tions may play an important role in shaping and guiding adaptive
decisions. In a series of experiments, it has been shown that during
their decision-making, these patients are not able to integrate emo-
tional signals from the body that are triggered when one is about
to make risky decisions (Bechara et al., 1997). These emotional
signals are thought to represent learned experiences from previ-
ous decisions, which can be integrated to inform current choices,
e.g., by helping to reject disadvantageous options (Bechara et al.,
2005).
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The adaptiveness of emotional responses has furthermore been
demonstrated in economic experimentations, where individuals
participate in financial exchanges in small groups. In some of these
economic games, a participant has the opportunity to spend some
of his money to punish other participants for unfair behavior,
such as failing to share a profit from a financial transaction. At
the group level, these punishments are highly effective for keeping
up fair interactions, and social groups whose members are willing
to punish unfair behavior function much better in the long run
(Fehr and Gachter, 2002). In order to punish, however, the pun-
ishing person has to sacrifice a part of his or her own profit, which
is highly inconsistent with economic theories of utility maximiza-
tion. Neuroimaging studies have shown that the observation of
unfair behavior is accompanied by activation of the insula, a brain
region involved in the experience of aversive emotional states (San-
fey et al., 2003), while a costly punishment of unfair behavior is
associated with an activation of regions of the brain’s reward sys-
tem (de Quervain et al., 2004). This suggests that the perception of
someone else’s unfair behavior (that is beneficial for the individ-
ual, but damaging for the group in the long run) triggers aversive
emotional responses, while punishing this behavior is perceived
as rewarding even though it involves financial losses. These emo-
tional reactions ensure long-term collaboration at the group level
and are thus more “rational” than decisions that are purely based
on economic utility maximization.
In parallel to these neuropsychological demonstrations, recent
theoretical developments in emotion psychology have abolished
the strong opposition of cognition and emotion, but instead
emphasize that emotional and cognitive processes are strongly
intertwined. Appraisal theories of emotion claim that emotions are
elicited as the individual automatically and continuously evaluates
the information in one’s environment, scanning for informa-
tion that is relevant to one’s concerns, goals, needs, and values
(Ellsworth and Scherer, 2003; Moors, 2010). Psychological and
neuroimaging research has helped to specify the evaluation cri-
teria that are involved in the appraisal process, showing that the
appraisal process is composed of very rapid automatic low-level
processes as well as slower, more deliberate processes that together
evaluate any incoming stimulus regarding the following crite-
ria: relevance (does this directly affect me), implications (what
does it mean for my well-being), coping potential (can I deal
with the challenge), and congruency with moral considerations
(is this appropriate with regards to my values and personal norms;
see, e.g., Grandjean and Scherer, 2008; Moors, 2010; Brosch and
Sander, 2013a; Gentsch et al., 2013).
The integrated outcome of this appraisal process determines
the type of emotional response that is elicited (Siemer et al.,
2007). For example, an appraisal of a situation as threatening
and uncontrollable will trigger a fear response including moti-
vational changes (a tendency to withdraw), physiological changes
(increases in heart rate), changes in expression (eyes wide open),
and changes in one’s subjective feeling (experiencing fear), thus
mobilizing the resources required to escape from the situation.
A key notion of appraisal theories is that, given that the emo-
tion is elicited based on an analysis of the situation that takes into
account the requirements of the situation and the coping potential
of the individual, emotional responses will be adaptive in their fit
to the situational challenge. To illustrate, in contrast to the pre-
vious example of a threat that is appraised as uncontrollable and
elicits fear, an obstruction that is appraised as controllable will
rather elicit an anger response consisting of a tendency to attack,
an increase in blood pressure, contracted eyebrows, and the expe-
rience of anger (Kreibig, 2010), thus enabling the individual to
remove the obstacle.
The detection of relevant environmental information further-
more leads to a fundamental reorganization of a number of
cognitive systems in order to prioritize the processing of the rele-
vant information. For example, emotionally relevant information
is automatically privileged by our perceptual and attentional sys-
tems, thus allowing the information to be noticed rapidly and,
once detected, become the focus of further processing and action
(Vuilleumier and Brosch, 2009). Furthermore, emotional informa-
tion is prioritized in memory. Memories of emotional events are
encoded and consolidated more deeply, and have a persistence and
vividness that other memories seem to lack (Phelps and Sharot,
2008). Given that they represent events that have been appraised
as especially relevant (Montagrin et al., 2013), emotional memo-
ries may serve as useful guides for future behavior. Emotion thus
operates as an adaptive filter for incoming information focalizing
our cognitive processing on information that is relevant to our
concerns, goals, needs, and values, and thus setting the stage for
subsequent behavior.
As illustrated by the examples in the previous sections, emo-
tions can be important drivers of our decision-making, over and
above cognitive factors and computations of utility alone. Effects
of emotions on decisions can occur at different time horizons. For
example, an emotion that is elicited in a concrete situation may
be used as indicator of the relevance of the situation and lead to
an appropriate decision (e.g., the indignation elicited by seeing a
heavily polluted pond may motivate you to immediately sign up
for a donation to Greenpeace). Alternatively, your anticipation of
a future emotion may impact on your decision between several
options (e.g., when deciding whether or not to buy a hybrid car,
you may think about the pride or satisfaction that the status related
to owning such a car may elicit and weigh it against the potential
disadvantages). These two influences are referred to as effects of
immediate emotions and anticipated emotions, respectively (Han
and Lerner, 2009)2.
Two important points result from this review of current devel-
opments in the emotion literature: (1) emotions emerge from
a rapid and automatic cognitive-affective analysis of the situa-
tional challenges as well as the individual’s potential to deal with
them, and thus very often are adaptive, intelligent responses that
reflect useful information. (2) Emotions play a big role in human
decision-making and hence drive behavior, and an analysis of
appraisal patterns and emotional responses may yield important
insights into individual choices and behaviors. While a considera-
tion of affective processes may also be very informative for explain-
ing energy-related decisions and behaviors, the most influential
2A third type of emotional effect on decision-making involves so-called incidental
emotions, which are emotions that arise from factors not related to the decision at
hand. For example, you refuse to make a donation to Greenpeace because you are
angry about an unrelated discussion you had with your boss earlier.
www.frontiersin.org March 2014 | Volume 2 | Article 11 | 3
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Brosch et al. Affective influences on energy-related decisions and behaviors
theories used in this field so far do not consider these factors as
important drivers of human behavior.
CURRENT THEORIES OF ENERGY-RELATED DECISIONS AND BEHAVIOR
The TPB (Ajzen, 1991) is the theoretical framework that is most
widely used in attempts to explain individual energy-related deci-
sions and behaviors. TPB assumes that a behavior is the conse-
quence of a reasoned process that weighs the costs and benefits
of the behavior. An individual’s intention to perform a certain
behavior (which is the most important predictor of the actual
behavior) is thought to be determined by three main factors: the
individual’s attitude toward the behavior (reflecting the explicit
evaluation of a behavior, based on a weighing of various costs and
benefits such as financial costs, effort, time, and potential profit),
the individual’s perceived behavioral control (referring to the ease
or difficulty with which the individual can engage in the behav-
ior), and subjective norm (an individual’s perception of the extent
to which important social reference persons such as friends, fam-
ily, or colleagues would approve or disapprove of the behavior
as well as the individual’s motivation to comply with these social
pressures). TPB has been successfully used to predict and explain a
wide range of behaviors, including energy-relevant behaviors such
as energy savings (Harland et al., 1999) or choice of transporta-
tion (Bamberg et al., 2003). A meta-analysis of studies using TPB
found that the factors postulated by the theory explained 39%
of the variance of intentions and 27% of the variance of actual
behaviors (Armitage and Conner, 2001). As a “rational choice”
theory, TPB conceptualizes individual decisions as driven by cog-
nitive processes underlying self-interested utility maximization,
and does not consider affective processes or emotions as important
drivers of decisions3.
While TPB is centered on the maximization of self-interest
(including conformity with subjective external norms), the VBN
(Stern, 2000) and its predecessor, the norm activation model
(NAM, Schwartz, 1977) have been developed with the explicit
aim to explain altruistic behavior. According to NAM, behavior
is driven by an individual’s personal norms, referring to a feel-
ing of moral obligation to perform a certain behavior. This moral
obligation results from an awareness of a problem and its poten-
tial consequences as well as the belief that one can do something
to avert these consequences. Based on this idea, VBN has been
specifically developed to explain environmental behaviors. VBN
proposes a causal chain of variables that has its starting point
with an individual’s core values. These values, which are broad
representations of an individual’s overarching goals, in turn deter-
mine an individual’s environmental beliefs, which describe how
an individual sees himself or herself in relation to the environ-
ment. Environmental beliefs are related to the extent to which
individuals think that their own behavior can have negative con-
sequences for the environment (awareness of consequences), which
in turn determines whether an individual assumes responsibility
3Even though a factor of the theory is labeled “attitude,” a concept frequently used
in emotion psychology, the attitude construct used in TPB is a very cognitive one,
based on the weighing of the potential costs and benefits of the action (“How many
positive and negative consequences do I expect from this behavior”), and as such
very close to the economic concept of utility.
for environmental problems (ascription of responsibility). Assumed
responsibility results in the activation of a moral obligation to act
(personal norms), which is positively related to the willingness and
intention to act pro-environmentally. VBN has been used to suc-
cessfully predict a number of environmentally related decisions
and behaviors, such as intentions to reduce car use (Nordlund and
Garvill, 2003) or to recycle (Guagnano et al., 1995). In general, its
predictive power seems to be higher for intentions than for actual
behaviors (Lindenberg and Steg, 2007).
The theoretical framework of the VBN with the postulated
causal chain of factors emphasizes cognitive factors such as beliefs
and norms. Affective processes or emotions are not explicitly
included into the driving factors of decisions and behaviors. Inter-
estingly, the VBN emphasizes the importance of core values, which
play a key role in the elicitation of emotions (Nelissen et al., 2007)
and their role in decision-making (Brosch and Sander, 2013b).
Furthermore, personal norms, reflecting the moral obligation to
act environmentally, are often assessed using items with an emo-
tional content such as “I feel guilty when I use a lot of energy”
(Abrahamse and Steg, 2009). Thus, at least implicitly emotions are
included here, but their role is not explicitly spelled out in the
theory.
Taken together, the two dominant psychological theories that
are used to explain energy-related decisions and behavior are
mainly centered on cognitive variables and mechanisms. TPB is
a rational choice theory focusing on expectancy× value computa-
tions that maximize self-interest, while VBN is a normative theory
combining value and belief systems into internal obligations about
the “right thing to do.” Given the recent advances in theorizing
on emotion, we feel that it may be worthwhile to attempt an
integration of affective processes into models that aim to explain
energy-related decisions and behaviors.
AN APPRAISAL–EMOTION PERSPECTIVE ON ENERGY-RELATED
DECISIONS AND BEHAVIORS
Energy-related decisions and behaviors are most likely driven by a
combination of several different factors and motivations, includ-
ing self-interested considerations (e.g., living in comfort, saving
money), social and altruistic motivations (e.g., gaining other’s
approval, preserving resources for others and future generations),
as well as ecological concerns (e.g., reducing damage to nature,
see also Lindenberg and Steg, 2007). Appraisal theory holds that
emotions reflect the integration of the relevance of an event or
object in the context of a person’s concerns, goals, needs, and val-
ues. Emotional processes and emotional experience may thus be
an appropriate mechanism for the integration of several classes of
motivational considerations (which may even be in conflict with
each other).
Here, we propose a theoretical approach that integrates an
analysis of cognitive appraisals concerning the relevance of energy
conservation as well as emotions that are experienced in situa-
tions that are related to energy conservation. In order to develop
a parsimonious, theory-driven approach, we based the model on
a body of research on appraisal processes that has identified the
psychological and neural mechanisms underlying the main classes
of appraisals that play important causal roles in the elicitation of
emotion (Ellsworth and Scherer, 2003; Brosch and Sander, 2013a),
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and specified the appraisal classes by adapting them to the the-
matic of energy conservation. The model thus predicts that the
following appraisals are important for the elicitation of emotions
as well as for the prediction of important individual differences in
energy-related decisions and behaviors:
1. Relevance: To what extent am I affected by the problem of
climate change?
2. Implication: How immediate is the impact of these changes on
my life?
3. Coping potential: To what extent can I contribute to the
prevention of these changes by saving energy?
4. Value-congruence: To what extent is energy conservation
desirable in the context of my value hierarchy?
Different people will appraise the same situation differently as
a function of their concerns, goals, needs, and values, and will thus
react with different emotional responses to these situations. An
individual’s appraisal profile should predict the frequency and/or
intensity of an individual’s emotional reactions in relevant sit-
uations, such as pride when successfully conserving energy, or
indignation when observing someone else waste energy. Finally,
both the pattern of an individual’s appraisal and the pattern of
an individual’s emotional reactivity in relevant situations should
be useful predictors of an individual’s intention to engage in
energy-saving behaviors.
Our aims in this contribution are twofold: (1) to move toward
a theoretical integration of cognitive and affective processes into
models that are used to explain energy-related decisions and
behaviors. Even though at least one psychological model widely
used in applied research (VBN) already implicitly includes affec-
tive factors (such as values and moral emotions), the role of
emotion is not explicitly included in most models. Here we aim
at developing this theoretical integration, taking into account the
most recent developments in emotion psychology. Importantly, we
wish to move beyond the perspective of emotion as an “irrational
interference,” but to offer a clear integrative theory that describes
the interplay of cognition and emotion and emphasizes the func-
tional, adaptive aspect of emotional responses. (2) To empirically
evaluate the potential contributions of our appraisal–emotion
approach to the explication of individual intentions to reduce
energy use, and especially to evaluate whether our approach can
explain parts of the variance of individual decisions and behaviors
that are not taken into account by mainly cognitive models focused
on self-interest (TPB) or normative considerations (VBN), and
thus may offer new and additional insight into the factors underly-
ing energy-related decisions and behaviors that are consequential
for a successful energy transition.
We compared the predictive power of three psychological the-
ories that have postulated sets of variables in order to explain
individual intentions to reduce energy use: the TPB, the VBN,
and the appraisal–emotion approach introduced here. In the
first step, we test the predictive power of each of the three the-
ories separately. In the second step, we combine the different
models using hierarchical regression analysis, to test whether the
appraisal–emotion model can explain any additional variance, or
whether the proposed factors are already sufficiently captured by
the established models.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
A total of 168 students of the University of Geneva (146 females,
22 males, mean age: 22.1 years, SD: 4.6) participated in the study.
MEASUREMENTS
We designed a number of questionnaires to measure the key vari-
ables postulated by the different theories. Given that numerous
studies already tested the degree to which TPB and VBN predict
energy-related decisions and behaviors (see, e.g., Poortinga et al.,
2003, 2004; Abrahamse and Steg, 2009, 2011), we adapted our
measures from these publications.
Theory of planned behavior
Attitude toward energy conservation was measured using several
semantic differential scales (“bad–good,”“unnecessary–necessary,”
“positive–negative,”“not fun–fun,”“important–unimportant,”and
“useless–useful”) that were combined into one score. Perceived
behavioral control was measured by three items (“I know how I
can save energy in daily life,”“I find it difficult to reduce my energy
use,” and “I can reduce my energy use quite easily”) combined into
one score. Subjective norms were measured by combining two
items (“My family members think it is important that I conserve
energy” and “My close friends think it is important that I con-
serve energy”) into one score. All responses were assessed using
seven-point Likert scales.
Value-belief-norm theory
Participants’ value priorities were measured using the Schwartz
Value Inventory (SVI, Schwartz, 1992). Participants rated 57 items
covering 10 different types of values (power, achievement, hedo-
nism, stimulation, self-direction, universalism, benevolence, tradi-
tion, conformity, and security) on a nine-point scale from opposed
to my principles (−1) through not important (0) to of supreme
importance (7). Individual scores for the second-level value dimen-
sions self-enhancement, self-transcendence, openness to change,
and conservatism were then formed by averaging scores across
the respective value types. Beliefs were assessed using the revised
version of the new environmental paradigm (NEP, Dunlap et al.,
2000) as well as five items measuring awareness of consequences
(“The greenhouse effect is a problem for society,” “The increas-
ing energy demand is a serious problem for our society,” “Energy
conservation contributes to a reduction of the greenhouse effect,”
“The depletion of fossil fuels is a problem,” and “Claims that we
are changing the climate are greatly exaggerated,” combined into a
single score), and one item measuring ascription of responsibility
(“I take joint responsibility for the depletion of energy resources”).
Personal norms were assessed by three items: “I feel guilty when
I choose a mean of transportation with high energy consump-
tion (e.g., plane) even though there is an energy-friendlier travel
option (e.g., train),” “I have a bad conscience when energy is con-
sumed unnecessarily in the household (e.g., lights on in unused
rooms),”and“I have a bad conscience when I buy, e.g., strawberries
from South Africa in the winter instead on seasonal fruit from the
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region,” combined into a single score). All responses were assessed
using seven-point Likert scales.
Appraisal–emotion theory
We measured key appraisal and emotional variables pertinent to
our appraisal–emotion approach with a newly developed set of
items. Relevance appraisal was measured using the item “How
close or distant do you feel as an individual to the problem of cli-
mate change (very distant/very close)?” Implication appraisal was
measured using the item “How immediate is the impact of these
ecological changes on your life (not at all immediate/highly imme-
diate)?” Coping potential appraisal was measured using the item
“To what extent can you contribute to the prevention of climatic
change by reducing energy use (not at all/very much)?” Value-
congruence appraisal was measured using the item“To what extent
is energy conservation desirable from the perspective of your per-
sonal values (not at all desirable/highly desirable)?” All responses
were assessed using seven-point Likert scales.
An individual’s tendency to experience emotions in situations
related to positive or negative ecological behavior was assessed with
a series of items (“How often do you feel ashamed because you
wasted energy?,”“How often do you feel angry because you wasted
energy?,” “How often do you feel anxious of the consequences of
global warming for our planet and its inhabitants?,” “How often
do you feel indignated because others waste energy?,” “How
often do you feel contempt because others waste energy?,” “How
often do you feel ashamed for others because they wasted energy?,”
and “How often do you feel proud because you have seen others
conserving energy or avoiding wasting energy?”). All responses
were assessed using five-point Likert scales (ranging from “never”
to “very often”) and combined into a single score.
Intentions to save energy
Finally, a set of items measured participants’ intentions to engage
in energy-saving behavior. Participants were presented with dif-
ferent energy-friendly behaviors (see Table 1, adapted from
Poortinga et al., 2003; Poortinga et al., 2004), and indicated their
intention to engage in the specific behavior using four-point Lik-
ert scales from 1 (not at all) to 4 (definitely). All responses were
combined into a single score, where higher scores indicate stronger
intentions to engage in energy-saving behavior.
RESULTS
A series of multiple regression analyses was conducted to evalu-
ate the predictive power of the different theoretical approaches.
In a first analysis, we used the variables postulated by TPB (atti-
tude, perceived behavioral control, and subjective norm) to predict
intentions to engage in energy-saving behavior (see Table 2).
About 34% of the individual variance in these intentions could
be explained by the TPB variables (very similar to the 39% average
variance explained reported in the meta-analysis by Armitage and
Conner, 2001). Congruent with theoretical predictions, partici-
pants with higher perceived normative pressure, higher perceived
behavioral control, and more positive attitudes toward energy
conservation had stronger intentions to engage in energy-saving
behaviors.
In a second regression analysis, we used the variables predicted
by VBN (core values, environmental beliefs, personal norms)
Table 1 | List of energy-saving behaviors covered in the questionnaire
(adapted from Poortinga et al., 2003; Poortinga et al., 2004).
Improve house insulation
Use energy-saving light bulbs
Buy more energy-efficient car
Insulate wall behind radiator with heat-reflecting foil
Install more energy-efficient heating system
Buy more energy-efficient refrigerator
Walking or cycling short distances up to 2.5 km
Switching off lights in unused rooms
Line drying of laundry (no dryer)
Do not leave appliances on stand-by
Take shorter showers
Rinsing the dishes with cold water
Walking or cycling distances up to 5 km
Go on holidays by train (instead of plane)
Using public transport
Buy seasonal fruits and vegetables
Set the thermostat to 18° maximally
Avoid eating meat
Table 2 | Regression results for theTPB variables to predict intentions
to engage in energy-saving behavior (N =168); β, standardized
regression coefficient; t, t -statistic; R2, total variance explained; F,
F -statistic.
β t R2 F
Subjective norm 0.235 3.28**
Perceived behavioral control 0.249 3.68***
Attitude 0.304 4.39***
Model 0.340 28.20***
***p<0.001, **p<0.01.
to predict intentions to engage in energy-saving behavior (see
Table 3). About 45% of the individual variance in these inten-
tions could be explained by the VBN variables. Congruent with
the theoretically predicted chain of variables (Stern, 2000), per-
sonal norms as the most proximal variable to actual intentions and
behavior was the most powerful (and the only significant) predic-
tor of energy-related intentions. Additional analyses confirmed the
chain of variables predicted by the model: personal norms were
strongly correlated with beliefs (NEP: r = 0.36, p< 0.001, aware-
ness of consequences: r = 0.35, p< 0.001, ascription of responsi-
bility: r = 0.40, p< 0.001), and beliefs in turn correlated strongly
with core values (self-transcendence values correlated with NEP:
r = 0.28, p< 0.001 as well as awareness of consequences: r = 0.25,
p= 0.001; conservation values correlated negatively with NEP:
r =−0.24, p= 0.002).
To test our appraisal–emotion approach, we then conducted
a third regression analysis with the predictor variables relevance
appraisal, implication appraisal, coping potential appraisal, value-
congruence appraisal, and experienced emotions (see Table 4).
About 39% of the individual variance in these intentions could be
explained by the appraisal–emotion variables, with each individual
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Table 3 | Regression results for the VBN variables to predict intentions
to engage in energy-saving behavior (N =168).
β t R2 F
Value: self-enhancement −0.073 −0.73
Value: self-transcendence 0.139 1.27
Value: openness to change 0.115 1.23
Value: conservation 0.029 0.27
Belief: new environmental
paradigm
0.101 1.42
Belief: awareness of
consequences
0.062 0.89
Belief: ascription of
responsibility
0.076 1.14
Personal norms 0.468 6.46***
Model 0.451 16.32***
***p<0.001.
Table 4 | Regression results for the appraisal–emotion variables to
predict intentions to engage in energy-saving behavior (N =168).
β t R2 F
Relevance appraisal 0.157 2.0*
Implication appraisal 0.126 1.95+
Coping potential appraisal 0.242 3.33**
Value-congruence appraisal 0.127 1.80+
Experienced emotions 0.231 3.10**
Model 0.394 21.02***
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.10.
predictor variable reaching at least marginal statistical signifi-
cance. Higher appraised relevance, more immediate appraised
implications, higher appraised coping potential, higher appraised
value congruency, and higher tendency to experience emotions in
energy-related situations all independently predicted more inten-
tions to engage in energy-saving behavior. Additional correlational
analyses confirmed the postulated link between appraisals and
emotions: each individual appraisal variable predicted increases
in experienced emotion in energy-relevant situations (relevance:
r = 0.49, p< 0.001, implication: r = 0.25, p= 0.001, coping poten-
tial: r = 0.40, p< 0.001, value congruency: r = 0.43, p< 0.001).
After having established the predictive power of each theoreti-
cal approach on its own, in a second step we performed a series of
hierarchical regression analyses in order to evaluate whether the
variables from the appraisal–emotion approach can explain addi-
tional variance over and above the two more established theories
TPB and VBN. We first tested for the combined predictive power of
the TPB and the appraisal–emotion variables (see Table 5). When
controlling for the TPB factors (which on their own explained 34%
of the variance, see above), appraisal–emotion factors explained
a statistically significant additional 13% of the variance for a
combined explained variance of 47%.
Table 5 | Hierarchical regression results forTPB (model 1) and the
combined variables fromTPB and the appraisal–emotion approach
(model 2, N =168).
β t R2 ∆R2 ∆F
Model 1 (TPB) 0.340 0.340 28.16***
Subjective norm 0.235 3.28**
Perceived behavioral control 0.249 3.68***
Attitude 0.304 4.39***
Model 2 (TPB and appraisal–
emotion approach)
0.469 0.129 7.70***
Subjective norm 0.136 1.99*
Perceived behavioral control 0.153 2.36*
Attitude 0.179 2.61*
Relevance appraisal 0.097 1.29
Implication appraisal 0.092 1.48
Coping potential appraisal 0.192 2.84**
Value-congruence appraisal 0.023 0.29
Experienced emotions 0.180 2.48**
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05.
We then tested for the combined predictive power of the VBN
and the appraisal–emotion variables (see Table 6). When control-
ling for the VBN factors (which on their own explained 45% of the
variance, see above), appraisal–emotion factors explained a statis-
tically significant additional 8% of the variance for a combined
explained variance of 53%.
In a final analysis, we analyzed the three models together in one
hierarchical regression model, with the TPB variables entered in
the first step, the VBN variables entered in the second step, and
the appraisal–emotion variables entered last (see Table 7). Adding
the VBN variables to the TPB variables explained a statistically sig-
nificant additional 17% of the variance. Importantly, adding the
appraisal–emotion variables to the combined TPB–VBN variables
led to another significant increase by 6% in the explained variance.
Taken together, the variable sets from the three theories explained
57% of the variance in intentions to reduce energy use.
DISCUSSION
In this manuscript, we propose a framework that applies recent
theoretical developments concerning the functionality of affec-
tive processes and emotions to the explanation of energy-relevant
decisions and behaviors. Based on previous work investigating
the impact of appraisal processes on the elicitation of emotion
and their impact on decision-making (see, e.g., Damasio, 1994;
Han and Lerner, 2009; Brosch and Sander, 2013a,b; Brosch et al.,
2013), we proposed that a sparse set of variables consisting of
appraisal criteria and emotional experiences in an energy-relevant
context may help explain energy-related decisions and behaviors.
We empirically investigated the explanatory power of the model
variables to predict intentions to reduce energy use and compared
the performance of the model to the two most frequently used the-
ories. Initial analyses showed that the variable sets postulated by
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Table 6 | Hierarchical regression results for VBN (model 1) and the
combined variables from VBN and the appraisal–emotion approach
(model 2, N =168).
β t R2 ∆R2 ∆F
Model 1 (VBN) 0.451 0.451 16.32***
Value: self-enhancement −0.073 −0.73
Value: self-transcendence 0.139 1.27
Value: openness to change 0.115 1.23
Value: conservation 0.029 0.27
Belief: new environmental
paradigm
0.101 1.42
Belief: awareness of
consequences
0.062 0.89
Belief: ascription of
responsibility
0.076 1.14
Personal norms 0.468 6.46***
Model 2 (VBN and
appraisal–emotion
approach)
0.533 0.082 5.42***
Value: self-enhancement −0.047 −0.50
Value: self-transcendence 0.161 1.56
Value: openness to change 0.142 1.63
Value: conservation 0.026 0.26
Belief: new environmental
paradigm
0.056 0.81
Belief: awareness of
consequences
0.043 0.64
Belief: ascription of
responsibility
0.041 0.66
Personal norms 0.309 3.95***
Relevance appraisal −0.011 −0.14
Implication appraisal 0.115 1.96+
Coping potential appraisal 0.214 3.23**
Value-congruence
appraisal
0.016 0.24
Experienced emotions 0.143 1.94+
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, +p<0.10.
the TPB, the VBN, and the appraisal–emotion approach explain
similar amounts of variance in intentions to reduce energy use.
More importantly, we then showed that when combined in hier-
archical regression analyses, the appraisal–emotion variables are
able to account for additional variance that is not explained by
the established models. This indicates that appraisal and emo-
tion processes may contribute to energy-related decisions over
and above considerations based on self-interest maximization
and normative concerns. The increase in explained variance was
especially pronounced when combining the appraisal–emotion
Table 7 | Hierarchical regression results forTPB (model 1), the
combined variables fromTPB and VBN (model 2), and the combined
variables forTPB,VBN, and the appraisal–emotion approach (model 3,
N =168).
β t R2 ∆R2 ∆F
Model 1 (TPB) 0.340 0.340 28.20***
Subjective norm 0.235 3.28**
Perceived behavioral
control
0.249 3.68***
Attitude 0.304 4.39***
Model 2 (TPB and VBN)
Subjective norm 0.078 1.15 0.479 0.173 6.95***
Perceived behavioral
control
0.194 3.08**
Attitude 0.144 1.91+
Value: self-enhancement −0.064 −0.66
Value: self-transcendence 0.098 0.91
Value: openness to
change
0.125 1.40
Value: conservation 0.018 0.17
Belief: new
environmental paradigm
0.047 0.65
Belief: awareness of
consequences
0.070 1.01
Belief: ascription of
responsibility
0.002 0.03
Personal norms 0.374 5.17***
Model 3 (TPB and VBN
and appraisal–emotion
approach)
0.566 0.053 3.68**
Subjective norm 0.060 0.91
Perceived behavioral
control
0.141 2.25*
Attitude 0.126 1.71+
Value: self-enhancement −0.047 −0.50
Value: self-transcendence 0.127 1.25
Value: openness to
change
0.148 1.71+
Value: conservation 0.014 0.14
Belief: new
environmental paradigm
0.022 0.31
Belief: awareness of
consequences
0.048 0.72
Belief: ascription of
responsibility
−0.011 −0.01
Personal norms 0.275 3.6***
(Continued)
Frontiers in Energy Research | Energy Systems and Policy March 2014 | Volume 2 | Article 11 | 8
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Brosch et al. Affective influences on energy-related decisions and behaviors
Table 7 | Continued
β t R2 ∆R2 ∆F
Relevance appraisal −0.023 −0.31
Implication appraisal 0.089 1.54
Coping potential appraisal 0.187 2.88**
Value-congruence
appraisal
−0.029 −0.44
Experienced emotions 0.131 1.81+
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.10.
variables with TPB, a rational choice theory based on the pursuit
of self-interest. But also when combining the appraisal–emotion
variables with VBN, which implicitly includes concepts related
to affect and emotion, additional variance was explained. Finally,
even when controlling for the impact of all variables postulated
by TPB and VBN together, the appraisal–emotion variables were
still able to explain additional variance in individual intentions
to reduce energy use4. Taken together, these findings suggest that
affective processes and emotions, which have been shown to sub-
stantially increase our understanding of a number of different
decision processes (Han and Lerner, 2009; Brosch and Sander,
2013b; Brosch et al., 2013), may also constitute a powerful fac-
tor determining individual decisions and behaviors in the energy
domain.
Intuitively, it should not come as too much of a surprise that the
vast spectrum of human decisions and behaviors relevant for the
energy consumption of a society (see Table 1 for just a small list of
examples) is not only driven by strictly cognitive considerations,
but also involves automatic and affectively colored processes. And
indeed, some attempts have already been made to more explicitly
integrate emotions into psychological theories of environmental
behavior (e.g., Triandis, 1977; Kals et al., 1999). However, far less
use is made of these theories in current research and intervention
development than that made of the two dominant theories TPB
and VBN. It may thus be fruitful to attempt an integration of the
notion that affective processes and emotions are a valuable source
of information for individual decision-making with existing mod-
els that focus on other drivers of decisions and behavior, such as
the incentive structure of the situation, individual self-interest,
or normative considerations. By combining recent insights about
the functionality of emotions with already existing approaches,
this perspective may become more interesting for scientists from
other academic traditions and potentially also for policy makers
searching for effective interventions. Interdisciplinary integration
is highly desirable for tackling a problem as complex and impor-
tant as the behavior change necessary for a successful energy
transition, as approaches that are rooted within the conceptual
4Note that even with the most complete model, a substantial portion (43%) of the
individual variance in behavioral intentions to reduce energy use remains unac-
counted for. Additional psychological (e.g., implicit biases, personality traits) or
non-psychological (e.g., socio-economic status, individual situational constraints)
factors that were not assessed in this investigation may furthermore contribute to
the formation of individual behavioral intentions.
boundaries of one discipline can only hope to capture a small part
of the whole process.
Energy-related decisions and behaviors are driven by a combi-
nation of different factors and motivations that need to be weighed
and balanced. For example, a person who chooses a very high
standard of living requiring intense energy consumption will expe-
rience immediate personal benefits (life comfort), while in the long
run causing disadvantages both for the individual and at the group
level (need for high energy production, potential energy shortages,
environmental damage). However, giving up on a high standard
of living to save energy will initially lead mainly to personal dis-
advantages (loss of comfort), with positive outcomes experienced
by society only in the long run. The immediate incentive struc-
ture thus will not motivate a self-interested individual to reduce
energy consumption (as long as the energy prices are held con-
stant). Nevertheless, recent economic work has demonstrated that
individuals are actually willing to sacrifice their immediate bene-
fits in order to promote behavior that is beneficial for the group in
the long run (Fehr and Gachter, 2002). Importantly, neuroimaging
results indicate that the trade-off of immediate individual gain for
the long-term advantage of the group is driven by neural regions
involved in the experience of reward and emotions (Sanfey et al.,
2003; de Quervain et al., 2004). These results not only indicate the
potential importance of considering emotions in the governance
of public goods such as unmined energy resources and clean air,
but also open up a path for the integration of energy conserva-
tion into classic economic perspectives: emotional reactions may
actually add utility value to energy conservation. The appraisal–
emotion model specifies a sparse set of appraisals that underlie
the elicitation of individual emotional responses in the energy
domain. It may be a promising approach to develop interven-
tions targeting the specific set of appraisal criteria proposed here.
Modifying an individual’s appraisal of the implications of energy
overconsumption, for example through targeted information pro-
vision campaigns, may change his/her emotional response, which
may in turn increase the utility value for certain decision options,
either via immediate emotions or anticipated emotions. This may
be an avenue to integrate affective processing and emotions into
economical and psychological rational choice models based on
utility and self-interested considerations such as the TPB.
Normative models such as the VBN already include core val-
ues, which play an important role in the elicitation of emo-
tions (Nelissen et al., 2007; Brosch and Sander, 2013a) and their
role in decision-making (Brosch and Sander, 2013b), as well as
moral emotions such as guilt or shame that serve to motivate
the normative function of social constraints. In this perspective,
environmental-friendly behavior seems to be conceptualized as
“morally correct” behavior, that is, people save energy to avoid
violating a social norm, resulting in real or imagined social dis-
approval and feelings of guilt. Affect motivates decisions and
behaviors insofar as individuals are trying to prevent negative out-
comes. However, that is only “half the truth” about the motivating
function of emotions. Emotions also motivate to promote pos-
itive outcomes, strive for reward, attain goals, and self-actualize
(Higgins, 1998). Thus, a more complete integration of affec-
tive processes into this kind of theory may capitalize on the full
range of human emotions. Interventions may aim at combining
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desired behaviors both with positive incentives that individuals
want to attain and with negative outcomes that individuals want
to prevent. For example, information campaigns or advertising
campaigns for energy-efficient products may include material that
emphasizes the positive emotions resulting from environmen-
tally responsible behavior (e.g., pride), while also mentioning the
potentially aversive consequences of environmental damage.
A perspective that considers emotions as yielding useful,
“rational” information may furthermore fruitfully be linked to
approaches from behavioral economics that focus on heuristics
and cognitive biases and their impact on decision-making. In fact,
at least two heuristics that are central to this perspective can be
linked to affective processing. The affect heuristic describes the
observation that an individual may substitute an initial affective
reaction for a thorough analysis of the situation (Finucane et al.,
2000). For example, participants who were asked to evaluate the
potential risks and benefits of nuclear energy showed a strong
negative correlation between their risk and benefits judgments,
especially when acting under time pressure, which was interpreted
as the impact of a rapid affective response to the evaluated stim-
ulus that participants used to inform both kinds of judgments.
The availability heuristic refers to the fact that information that
is easily retrievable from memory is especially influential dur-
ing a decision process (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973). Whereas
both types of heuristics are usually discussed in a dual process
framework that opposes intuitive/affective responses to rational
thought, we have outlined above that recent psychological and
neuroscientific research suggests a revision of this perspective (e.g.,
Damasio, 1994). Even rapid affective responses based on fast, auto-
matic appraisal processes may contain useful information that
can improve decision-making, and thus should not be opposed
to rational processes (see Brosch, 2013, for a more detailed dis-
cussion). Furthermore, it has been shown that information that
has previously been appraised as relevant for one’s concerns is pri-
oritized in memory and thus more easily retrievable (Montagrin
et al., 2013). As such, it seems highly adaptive that information
that was relevant in the past should have a larger impact on cur-
rent decision-making (Phelps and Sharot, 2008). Interventions
that aim at nudging people toward desired outcomes (Thaler and
Sunstein, 2008) should take into account the possibility to lever-
age rapid automatic appraisal processes by appropriately framing
the decision situation. For example, in a recent study household
energy use was reduced and kept below average by combining
information about consumption patterns with minimal affective
information (a smiley face for households using less than average
energy, see Schultz et al., 2007).
Thus, taking into account affective processes and emotions
related to energy conservation (or the lack of energy conserva-
tion) may not only substantially increase our understanding of
the mechanism that underlie individual decisions and behaviors
related to energy use, but may also be successfully integrated with
and complement other existing perspectives in the behavioral sci-
ences, contributing to the interdisciplinarity that is required for
the development of efficient interventions.
One qualification of the work presented here is that the evi-
dence supporting the appraisal–emotion model so far is based
exclusively on self-report measures, i.e., participants were asked
to report their appraisal structure and to remember their emo-
tional experience in relevant situations. This is problematic both
for methodological and conceptual reasons. At the methodological
level, participants may have been prone to a number of response
biases that come with the self-report format. For example, par-
ticipants may have been motivated to respond in a manner that
will be viewed favorably by others and thus exaggerated their
intentions to reduce energy use, or in a manner coherent with
their personal theories about emotion and thus exaggerated the
link between appraisals, emotions, and decisions. However, this
problem is shared by most empirical research in this field, which,
given the variables that researchers are interested in, is strongly
based on self-report and questionnaire data. An important next
research step will be to link individual appraisal structures and
emotions not only to intentions to reduce energy use, but also
to objective measures of actual behavior (e.g., actual energy use).
At the conceptual level, psychological and neuroimaging research
has shown that the appraisal process occurs very rapidly and in a
partially automatic fashion (Grandjean and Scherer, 2008; Brosch
and Sander, 2013a). Thus, not all aspects of the appraisal process
are necessarily accessible to introspection and can be reported in
a questionnaire. The aspects of appraisal that reach conscious-
ness may only represent the “tip of the iceberg” (Scherer, 2005).
This issue needs to be tackled by combining multiple methods
over and above self-report, such as the measurement of energy-
related appraisal processes at the neural level and an assessment of
the different components of the emotional response as it occurs,
including physiological responses and elicited action tendencies.
Considering automatic affective processes in energy-relevant
situations may furthermore vastly improve our understanding of
the mechanisms underlying habits, automatized behaviors which
are also very important determinants of energy use (Marechal,
2009), but are driven by mechanisms different from the ones
underlying more deliberate decision-making (Aarts and Dijkster-
huis, 2000). Thus, complementing standard self-report measures
with implicit tasks and neuroimaging methods seems an especially
promising approach to develop more complete models of energy-
related decision-making and behavior and may well become the
future gold standard.
To sum up, in this contribution we argue for an integration of
affective processes and emotions into the study of energy-related
decisions and behavior. In contrast to theories that consider emo-
tions as “irrational interference,” we emphasize that cognitive and
affective processes are closely intertwined. Emotional responses
represent important information about the relevance of an object
or situation for an individual’s concerns, goals, needs, and values.
They may thus play an important and adaptive role in driving indi-
vidual decisions and behaviors, over and above considerations of
utility, beliefs, and behavioral norms. A sparse set of factors assess-
ing an individual’s appraisal processes and emotional response
patterns with regards to energy-relevant situations can predict a
sizeable amount of variance in intentions to reduce energy use.
Importantly, a comparison with two established models shows that
the appraisal–emotion approach can explain variance over and
above models focusing on self-interest and normative considera-
tions, respectively. We argue that affective processes and emotions
can and should be integrated into other theoretical perspectives
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developed within the behavioral sciences that are important in
research on energy use. Energy-related decisions and behaviors
are manifold. A thorough understanding of the underlying mech-
anisms requires the simultaneous consideration of the decision
situation with its specific incentive structure, the decider with
his or her beliefs, values, appraisals, and emotions, and the type
of decision, ranging from highly deliberate informed choices to
habitual behaviors.
A better understanding of the factors influencing individual
energy-related decisions and behaviors is important for a success-
ful energy transition, and thus of high societal interest. Over the
last two decades, the “affective turn” has fundamentally changed
the way psychologists and neuroscientists think about emotions,
their adaptive function, and their role in decision-making. We
hope that the research and the open questions outlined here will
contribute to an integration of these ideas into research on one of
society’s fundamental problems.
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